Incididunt nisi non nisi incididunt velit cillum magna commodo proident officia enim.
David HUME"Despite this variety of speculation, these thinkers all shared some important assumptions, notably a view of the world as created by divine reason, and — relatedly — as potentially ‘intelligible’ to human reason. Hume’s special significance is as the first great philosopher to question both of these pervasive assumptions, and to build an epistemology and philosophy of science that in no way depend on either of them."(ix)
"Throughout this period, religion exerted a profound influence over all philosophical and scientific speculation. No philosopher or scientist could afford to ignore the religious implications of his work, and many were attacked on account of their supposed heresy or ‘infidelity’. Galileo’s punishment by the Inquisition provides the most famous example, deemed heretical for stating that the Earth orbits the Sun and thus contradicting scriptural texts such as ‘The Lord . . . has established the world; it shall never be moved’ (Psalm 93: 1) and the famous creation story in Genesis (according to which ‘the heaven and the earth’ are created ‘in the beginning’, and the Sun is not made until the fourth day). Hearing of Galileo’s condemnation, Descartes withheld his own projected treatise The World, and took great pains to exclude anything unorthodox from his published writings. But this did not save his works from being added (in 1663) to the Roman Catholic Index of Prohibited Books, a list that came to include almost every significant work of post-medieval Western philosophy." [mijn nadruk] (xx)
""With eternal hellfire or salvation at stake, it is not surprising that religious disputes could become impassioned and aggressive. Hume himself, living in Calvinist Scotland, accordingly took care to avoid overt infidelity, for example suppressing his own potentially incendiary treatment of immortality to be published only posthumously.(...) it was still prudent for Hume to tread carefully where Christianity was concerned, and an explicit denial of its central doctrines would be very likely both to provoke a hostile reaction, and also to upset numerous friends. Even in eighteenth-century Edinburgh, the ‘Athens of the North’ which saw the brilliant flowering of intellectual activity of which Hume was a leading light, religious orthodoxy remained a potent force and a centre of allegiance for the vast majority." [mijn nadruk] (xxiii)
"Unlike many thinkers in both earlier and later centuries, those of the Enlightenment — at least in Britain — typically saw no conflict between science and religion, but viewed new discoveries as providing yet more evidence of the intricacy, wisdom, and benevolence of God’s handiwork. (...) The Design Argument for God’s existence thus became widely viewed as the strongest pillar of natural religion." [mijn nadruk] (xxiv)
" Of course we are limited creatures, so our pure rational insight may not extend very far, but the apparent success of philosophers in discovering ‘intelligible’ laws of nature indicated that it was at least partially applicable beyond mathematics, to the operations of the physical world."(xxiv-xxv)
Het revolutionaire van Hume is dat hij tegen beide vooronderstellingen ingaat (zie eerste citaat). Millicam vervolgt met een gedetailleerde bespreking van de Enquiry.
[Maar ik wil dat boek eerst zelf lezen voordat ik die bespreking doorneem.]
"The mere philosopher is a character, which is commonly but little acceptable in the world, as being supposed to contribute nothing either to the advantage or pleasure of society; while he lives remote from communication with mankind, and is wrapped up in principles and notions equally remote from their comprehension." [mijn nadruk] (5)
[Ik weet niet, hoor, is dit niet gewoon het cliché over filosofen?]
"But this obscurity in the profound and abstract philosophy, is objected to, not only as painful and fatiguing, but as the inevitable source of uncertainty and error. Here indeed lies the justest and most plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not properly a science; but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular superstitions, which, being unable to defend themselves on fair ground, raise these intangling brambles to cover and protect their weakness. Chaced from the open country, these robbers fly into the forest, and lie in wait to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the mind, and overwhelm it with religious fears and prejudices. The stoutest antagonist, if he remit his watch a moment, is oppressed. And many, through cowardice and folly, open the gates to the enemies, and willingly receive them with reverence and submission, as their legal sovereigns. "(7-8)
"In vain do we hope, that men, from frequent disappointment, will at last abandon such airy sciences, and discover the proper province of human reason. (...) The only method of freeing learning, at once, from these abstruse questions, is to enquire seriously into the nature of human understanding, and shew, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects. We must submit to this fatigue, in order to live at ease ever after: And must cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate. "(8)
[Hume veroordeelt dus niet alle metafysica, er bestaat wat hem betreft ook een ware metafysica naast alle onzinnig speculatieve.]
"It cannot be doubted, that the mind is endowed with several powers and faculties, that these powers are distinct from each other, that what is really distinct to the immediate perception may be distinguished by reflection; and consequently, that there is a truth and falsehood in all propositions on this subject, and a truth and falsehood, which lie not beyond the compass of human understanding."(9)
"Moralists have hitherto been accustomed, when they considered the vast multitude and diversity of those actions that excite our approbation or dislike, to search for some common principle, on which this variety of sentiments might depend. And though they have sometimes carried the matter too far, by their passion for some one general principle; it must, however, be confessed, that they are excusable in expecting to find some general principles, into which all the vices and virtues were justly to be resolved. The like has been the endeavour of critics, logicians, and even politicians: Nor have their attempts been wholly unsuccessful; though perhaps longer time, greater accuracy, and more ardent application may bring these sciences still nearer their perfection."(10)
"The most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation."(12)
'Thoughts and Ideas' zijn dus minder levendig en 'kleurrijk' dan 'impressions'.
"By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned. "(13)